Abstract-Most wireless sensor networks require that every large enough node contain certain properties. By using the Szemerédi's regularity lemma, one can approximate a complex network by a much simpler object in such a way that the approximation is "regular" for most pairs of partitions of this network. After obtaining a more traceable network, we establish bounds for the probability of the property that a random key pre-distribution subgraph satisfies that each node has a path of length to its th -hop neighbors. The end result is a sharp threshold p ≥ Cn −( −1)/ that satisfies this property and that can be considered as an application of the sparse Szemerédi's regularity lemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called wireless sensor networks (WSN) has been a buzzword and a popular research topic over the past ten years or so because it provides new solutions to problems such as temperature and humidity monitoring, analysis of the motion of tornadoes, fire detection, military defense, and health monitoring [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . Especially, compared to the traditional sensors, the sensors of WSN are small, cheap, intelligent, and energy-efficient. That is why we use them in some hostile environments. To better understand whether traditional technologies can be applied to WSN or not, Akyildiz et al. [3] paid special interest in the differences between the wireless sensor networks and the wireless ad hoc networks. Among them, a striking difference is in that the topologies of a sensor network are changing very frequently compared with the wireless ad hoc networks. In the same study, Akyildiz et al. also pointed out that the sensors of WSN are limited in power, computational capacity, memory, and storage. For these reasons, most efficient algorithms, applications, and policies for wireless ad hoc networks are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. That is why new solutions are needed for WSN.
Recently, several studies [2] , [3] , [5] , [6] have tried to discuss and review the research on WSN from different perspectives. In [6] , Yick et al. divided WSN into five types: terrestrial WSN, underground WSN, underwater WSN, multimedia WSN, and mobile WSN, each of which can be adopted to the particular approach in question. More recently, a promising research direction, i.e., security [7] , [8] , [9] that may affect the performance and reliability of WSN has been addressed. Du and Xiao [7] did a good survey on the security of the sensor networks. They introduced several attacks on the sensor networks based on the layers. This classification helps differentiate the security research issues on WSN. For instance, two well known attacks on the physical layer introduced by this study are jamming and tampering. The jamming attack uses a small number of randomly distributed jamming nodes to disrupt the network in such a way that all of the nodes in the sensor network cannot be served. The tampering attack means that the adversary (i.e., the attacker) can capture the sensor node and extract some important information by tampering with the node they captured. By using this classification, the system manager can easily find the solution when the system undergoes the security problem. However, many studies [7] , [8] pointed out that because the cost of tamper-resistant sensor nodes is very high, most of today's WSN nodes are, by design, not tamper-resistant. For this reason, when the adversary compromises a node, the whole sensor networks will be compromised [7] , [8] . The random key pre-distribution scheme described herein avoids such a problem, by reducing the number of nodes compromised. Nevertheless, this may somehow affect the connectivity. The question is, how do we balance such a tradeoff, i.e., the number of nodes compromised and the connectivity?
In this paper, we analyze the question of the threshold probability function for the property "every pair of vertices lies in a secure path" with respect to a security parameter p [9] . The goal is to obtain a threshold function p 0 (n) such that if p p 0 , then the probability of a security subgraph having the above property is close to 1 whereas if p is slightly smaller than p 0 , then the probability is close to 0. We show that in almost all security graphs, the number of secure paths of length is close to its expectation provided that ε is sufficiently small, p ≥ Cn −( −1)/ , and n is sufficiently large.
II. RELATED WORKS
Random key pre-distribution (RKP) based schemes [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] have been developed to guarantee the existence of specific properties, such as disjoint secure paths and disjoint secure cliques, to achieve a secure cooperation between nodes [13] , [11] . In the RKP wireless sensor networks, such subgraph count problems are difficult to attack because there are several levels of dependencies among the problems. In [7] , Du et al. introduced several key pre-distribution schemes. Of them are fully pairwise key scheme, λ-secure key scheme, p-probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme, q-composite key pre-distribution scheme, random pairwise key scheme, and multi-space key scheme. Key pre-distribution schemes can also be classified according to the security model, be it deterministic or probabilistic, and the properties of the group keys. The primary threat of a security model is the ability of a compromised node to obtain a group key. The deterministic key establishment schemes can guarantee that a communication group C ∈ C is able to establish a common key (or pairwise key). In contrast, the probabilistic key establishment schemes of a communication group have a certain probability of being secure. This kind of group key schemes is dependent on the combinatorial methods. In our previous works [14] , [15] , we proposed a scheme to enhance the connectivity by using path-key. We also presented a rather precise probabilistic model.
Following are several reasons why the random graph theory is not applicable to subgraph count of RKP networks.
1) Subgraph count is positively correlated. If some subgraphs occur, the probability of remaining subgraphs that occur will increase. It is easy to show that the condition amounts to knowing information about the occurrence of some edges, and therefore we are allowed to use incomplete edges to find a subgraph that is nondisjointed. 2) A physical link is not independent of the existence of other links. The sensor nodes are deployed on a geometry space and therefore counting of substructures is far from independent due to the triangle inequality. When dealing with a subgraph count in a geometry space, one may assume that X = v 1 , . . . , v n are randomly scattered in a d-dimension cube of volume n/λ, where λ is a Poisson parameter. Let |C i | denote the size of the component of G(X , λ) containing vertex i. Then we have
Note that p k (λ) was defined in [16] as
where
Moreover, B(0, x 1 , . . . , x k ) is the volume of the union of 1-balls centered at 0, x 1 , . . . , x k . Thus, the number of vertices of G(X , λ) lying in a subgraph of order k divided by n converges to p k (λ).
3) The secure links are not independent. The study of random intersection graph G(n, K, k) is motivated by its application to RKP. Generally speaking, the classical RKP to accomplish this is due to Eschenauer and Gligor [17] . Each sensor node is loaded with k distinct encryption keys, randomly taken from a pool of K possible keys, before deployment. Two sensors can form a secure link if they are within wireless communication range and share at least one encryption key. Most of the subsequent literature model G(n, K, k) by the Erdös-Rényi random graph G(n, p) [10] , [13] where
Modeling G(n, K, k) in this way is unsatisfactory since the behavior of G(n, p) and G(n, K, k) is essentially different. As far as the subgraph count problem on RKP is concerned, the graph model must exploit the fact that many more subgraphs will be in G(n, K, k) than in G(n, p), especially when k is small. Intuitively, it is complicated to model the subgraph count problem in RKP by combining random geometry graph G(X , λ) with random intersection graph G(n, K, k). This is due to the fact that in both models, the edges involve different levels of dependency. Therefore, the goal in this paper is to study pseudorandom graphs as models for networks with an additional tolerance ε to control the dependency error.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
We use vG and v(G) to denote the number of vertices of a graph G and e G and e(G) to denote the number of edges. We identify a path with + 1 vertices by P . For any vertex set W ⊆ V , let G[W ] denote the graph induced by W . We denote the number of edges in G[W ] by e G (W ) = e(W ).
For any pair of possibly disjoint subsets U, W ⊆ V (G), let E G (U, W ) = E(U, W ) denote the set of edges in G with one endpoint in U and the other endpoint in W . We also define
The expression |Γ(v) refers to the neighborhood of a vertex v in G. Since we often have to consider the neighborhood into a subset W ⊆ V , we abbreviate
which is the degree of vertex v into the set W . The neighborhood spanned by a set of vertices Q is denoted by Γ(Q); that is,
For neighborhoods inside specific partitions, we will use the abbreviations
The Szemerédi's regularity lemma is a powerful tool for tackling many problems in combinatorics and graph theory [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] . The notion of ε-regular graphs was introduced by Szemerédi in [22] . It describes a property that is typically observed in random bipartite graphs. Therefore, ε-regular graphs are frequently referred to as pseudorandom graphs. Those graphs have gained importance since it was shown in [22] , which states that any sufficiently large graph allows for a nearly complete partitioning into constantly many vertex classes of equal size such that most of them are pairwise ε-regular. In general, the regularity lemma imposes an additional structure on very large graphs, which can be used to identify certain small substructures like graphs of fixed size.
To simplify our discussion that follows, the following notations are used. Let e(U, W ) be the number of edges between U and W where U, W ∈ V are two disjoint subsets. Furthermore,
We say that the pair (U, W ) is (ε, p)-regular, if for all U ⊂ U and W ⊂ W with |U | ≥ ε|U | and |W | ≥ ε|W |, we have
Below, we shall sometimes use the expression ε-regular with respect to density p to mean that (U, W ) is an (ε, p)-regular pair. If B = (U, W ; E) is a bipartite graph and (U, W ) is an (ε, B, p)-regular pair, we say that B is an (ε, p)-regular bipartite graph.
Intuitively, a bipartite graph (V i ∪ V 2 , E) is (epsilon)-regular if its edges are distributed in a random-like way. The parameter ε reflects the uniformity of this distribution. The smaller the ε, the more uniform the edge distribution in G.
Definition 1. For a path P , let G( , n, m) be the family of graphs on vertex set V = u∈V (P ) V u , where the sets V u are pairwise disjoint sets of vertices of size n, and edge set E = {u,v}∈E(P ) E uv where E uv ⊆ V u × V v and |Exy| = m. Let G(H, n, m, e) ⊆ G( , n, m) denote the set of graphs in G( , n, m) satisfying that each (V u ∪V v , E xy ) is an (ε)-regular graph.
Definition 2. Let B( , n, m, δ) ⊆ G( , n, m) denote the subfamily consisting of all members that contain fewer than
Observe that apart from the factor (1 − δ), if the edges are randomly distributed between the vertex sets of any graph in G(H, n, m), we expect n +1 m n 2 copies of P in any member of this family.
IV. MAIN RESULTS Given a arbitrary graph G (WSN) with n vertices (sensor nodes) and m edges (links), the behavior of the RKP sensor network can be taken as a random subgraph S Gp = S(G, p) of G by keeping each edge of G with probability p independently.
Our main result of this paper is the proof of Theorem 2, a counting version of the KLR-Conjecture, in the case when H is the path P of size and m ≥ Cn ( +1)/ . Theorem 1. (Bad graphs) For 3 ≤ ≤ log n and every δ, β > 0, there exists ε 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε 0 , there exists a constants C such that
Theorem 2. (Bad extension) For 3 ≤ ≤ log n and every δ, β > 0, there exists ε 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε 0 , there exists a constant C such that
Theorem 1 asserts that the number of bad graphs is very small while Theorem 2 states that there are at most β m n 2 m graphs belonging to G( , n, dn 2 , ε) that could be extended by bad (ε , p)-regular graphs.
The following corollary asserts that for a given graph G ∈ G(n, m, ε), at least (1 − ε)n vertices can establish a secure path to its -hop neighbors.
Corollary 3. For 3 ≤ ≤ log n and every δ, β > 0, there exists ε 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε 0 , p 1/ log n, there exists a constant C such that every RKP subgraph satisfying p ≥ Cn −( −1)/ has all but at most εn nodes that can establish a secure path to its -hop neighbors with probability 1 − o(1).
A. Counting Lemmas
The objects to be counted will be referred to as "bad," because later we will identify them with substructures of graphs for which the occurrence of a complete subgraph cannot be guaranteed. These structures must be shown to occur very rarely in order to prove Corollary 3. Since almost all vertices in an (ε, d)-regular graph have Θ(m/n) neighbors, one can deduce that the neighborhood of Θ(n 2 /m) vertices typically has size Θ(m/n · n 2 /m) = Θ(n). Furthermore, the neighborhoods of the vertices have disjoint parts of size Θ(m/n); that is, every vertex contributes an equal part to the combined neighborhood of all vertices. In the sequel, we give a formal definition of this structure [18] . Definition 3. (Covering vertices) Let P ⊆ V i . I j (P ; ν) be defined as an (ordered) subset ofP ⊆ P with maximum cardinality such that the following property is satisfied. Let P = {v 1 , . . . , v k }. Then, there exist pairwise disjoint sets 
Definition 5. (ν-multicovers) Let ν, ε > 0. We call a set Q ⊆ V i a ν-multicover of V j if there exist pairwise disjoint subsets P 1 , . . . , P r ⊆ Q with r =:= |Q|/p ν and |P 1 | = · · · = |P r | = p ν such that P i is a ν-cover of V j , i = 1, . . . , r.
We define two kinds of bad structures contained in each G ∈ B( , n.m, ε). for ≤ i ≤ + 1, there exists a set X ⊂ V of size at least δn such that for all q ≥ Cp −( −1)/ , at least β q n q are not ν-multicover Now we construct all possibilities of bad events for -tuple
The following lemma states that if we choose a bad set Q with respect to v within V 1 , then the number of such sets that are allowed to be selected is very small. 
Lemma 2. (Count (b)) For β, ν, ε > 0, there exists a constant ε 0 = ε 0 (β, ν, ε ) such that for ε ≤ ε 0 , any pair (V i , V j ) satisfies the number of sets with size s that are not ν-multicover is at most
Observe that if all families of disjoint sets Q i that satisfy a certain undesired property satisfy i |Q i | ≤ δn, then we can delete at most δn vertices such that none of them have this bad property.
V. THE PROOFS Theorem 1 is an easy consequence from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we omit its proof here. Theorem 2 is more complicated to prove. Our proof strategy is as follows. First, we define a family of bad graphs to be excluded from the family G ( , n, m, ε) . Then, we shall show that there are merely a tiny fraction of all graphs in B( , n, m, δ) ∩ G( , n, m, ε) that can be extended to an (ε, d)-regular graph.
Proof: (of Theorem 2) Let x ≥ n 2 m log n and ε
In particular, Lemma 1 shows that all but a β x fraction of all tuples are good. We prove Theorem 2 by constructing all graphs that satisfy the above properties. First, ). There are at most
ways to choose the graph G j k . Then, we want to choose extensions of G j k to satisfy (ε, d)-regular. As these extensions have to belong to G( − 1, x, dx 2 , ε), the numbers of ways to select the neighborhoods of vertices in V j is thus at most
Similarly, there are at most β Put all of these together, we obtain the upper bound
Let β = 2 αm+ 2 mβm . We complete the proof.
Now we prove Corollary 3.
Proof: First of all, let d and ε be given. We set
.
By applying β and ε to Theorem 2, we obtain ε 0 and C. Then let ε = min{d/2, ε /4, ε 0 }. Suppose V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V } is an -partite partition graph from B(P , n, T, ε , δ). We shall show that an RKP subgraph of B is unlikely to appear in S 
Hence, the probability of the random subgraph S G ∈ F is bounded from above by
The result now follows as noted by Markov inequality. Now we prove Lemma 1. Proof: (of Lemma 1) Since we are supposed to build a bad pair of (Q 1 , Q 2 ) that satisfies condition (a), there are at least q /2 indices i such that |Γ(v i , Q)| ≤ (1−δ)x/(q /2). Let δ ≤ 2 −3ε n . Since there only δx choices for v i , the number of bad sets Q is at most
where ε n ≤ q ≤ n/4. Since that subsets Q 1 , . . . , Q r of size x are chosen sequentially, any choice of a bad subset Q i may depend on the previously chosen subsets (Q 1 , . . . , Q i−1 ). Moreover, at least δr = δαn/x sets Q i must be bad and do not depend on the order of choice. Hence, the probability of a subset Q ≥ ε x being bad is at most
In other words, there are at most δ αx/2 n (1+ε )x bad sets Q. Then, the proof follows.
Finally comes the proof of Lemma 2. Proof: (of Lemma 2) Let Q denote the family of sets of size s in V i that is a ν-multicover of V j , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ + 1. First, Lemma 1 states that the probability of a randomly chosen set X ⊆ Q with |X| = p ν is at most β pν n pν . Moreover, at least δr sets X i must be bad and do not depend on the order of choice. Hence, we first count the number of sets Q that contain δr bad subsets. We start by partitioning the set Q into r := s/p ν disjoint sets of size s and an additional set of size s − rp ν . Hence, we have at most
ways to do that. Since there are s! pν ! r (s−rpν )! n s ways to partition, the lemma follows.
VI. SIMULATION
As depicted in Figs. 1, 2, and 3 , the threshold phenomenon of the property we desire "every node has a secure path to -hop neighbors" is given in this section, with a minor modification. Let AEVP denote the property "at least 1-ε node has a secure path to the -hop neighbors." One can see that the probability that satisfies AEVP is rapidly increased to 1. In what follows, we use n to denote the number of nodes and d the average degree. Although the main results in Section IV show that the probability is 1 − o(1). Here one can observe that the probabilities in the simulation have exponential decay behaviors. The reason is similar to the difference between binomial model and uniform model. In other words, we fix the number of edges and choose each bad graph uniformly at random in our proofs. However, for simulations, we take each pair of vertices to be an edge with probability p independently. Consequently, the probabilities in the simulations are equivalent to those in the main results.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed that pseudorandom subgraphs with size smaller than the density of the given ε graphs still inherit good property with high probability. Our main contribution is determined a desired RKP probability p such that every vertex can find a secure path to its -hop neighbors, provided that p ≥ Cn −( −1)/ and some appropriate constants are selected. The most challenging part is when the sensor network is rather sparse. In this case, the number of all possible RKP subgraphs is too large to attack the exponential bounds. Thus approaches based on large deviation inequality generally seem to fail to 
